Minisymposium (ID: SS-DF)

Decisions and Fairness

Marc Kilgour (Wilfrid Laurier University) and William Zwicker (Union College)

When individuals vote in an election, when a city’s budget is decided, or when goods and/or bads are allocated among many parties, individual preferences, or statements about them, are converted into a collective outcome by some mechanism. Which mechanism is best? Answers to this question address some combination of fairness, efficiency, tractability, conceptual transparency, and strategic manipulability. This session will feature applications of mathematics and computer science relevant to important questions in economics and political science, and more generally to the understanding of mechanisms, group decisions, sharing, and fairness.

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