Minisymposium (ID: SS-SCT)

Social Choice Theory

Organizers: D. Marc Kilgour (Wilfrid Laurier University) and Marcus Pivato (Trent University)

How should a group of people make a collective decision? Elect a government? Divide a common resource? Match claimants to indivisible resources? Aggregate individual judgements into a logically consistent consensus? Combine private information in an epistemically optimal way? Negotiate an agreement?

Many rules have been proposed to produce collective decisions, but their appropriateness has been debated. Is the implementation of a rule computationally complex? Is the rule susceptible to manipulation, and if so how complex is that manipulation? Is the rule vulnerable to paradox and inconsistency? If a rule is internally consistent, socially efficient, and procedurally fair, is that enough? Or should it instantiate some theory of social justice? Can the conflicting norms of welfare, fairness, and collective rationality ever be reconciled? These are some of the questions that the mathematical theory of social choice seeks to answer.

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